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SECRECY Is DEAD - LONG LIVE TRADE SECRETS
DEREK E. BAMBAUERf
ABSTRACT
The future of intellectual property is in trade secrets. Changes to pa-
tent law make obtaining a patent more costly in some cases and impossi-
ble in others. The relentless spread of networked computing, with its
inevitable vulnerabilities, and digital data make non-legal means of
maintaining secrecy increasingly unreliable. Innovators will be forced to
turn to trade secrets. This newfound prominence for trade secrecy will
generate tensions with freedom of speech protections, federalism, and the
balance between civil and criminal enforcement. The Article, part of a
symposium on the Future World IP by the Denver Law Review, closes
with a set of testable empirical predictions to evaluate its claims.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The future of intellectual property is in trade secrets.
This Article predicts that innovators will shift to using trade secret
law to safeguard advances, rather than filing for patent protection or us-
ing contractual and technological self-help to keep inventions confiden-
tial. There are two reasons for this coming rise of trade secrets. The first
is that other means of keeping advances secret are becoming far less ef-
fective in the digital networked era. The second is that obtaining a patent
has become more difficult and less certain with recent doctrinal devel-
opments. By process of elimination, that leaves trade secret law to fill the
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gap-innovators will rely on relative rather than absolute secrecy. This
will lead to development of and pressure on that field's doctrine, raising
questions of federalism, enforcement, and conflict with other legal re-
gimes. Normatively, this Article comes neither to praise the rise of trade
secret nor to bury it, but to elucidate tensions and issues that will accom-
pany its new prominence.
This Article continues with three additional Parts. The first explains
why doctrinal changes have made patents harder to obtain and what
technological changes have made secrecy more difficult to maintain The
second explores the changes that increased reliance on trade secret will
generate, including pressure on other doctrines, on federalism, and on
criminal enforcement of intellectual property. The final Part concludes
by making a set of testable predictions about the shift this Article fore-
sees.
II. SECRETS AND DISCLOSURE
A. Two Roads Diverged: Protecting InnovationI
Intellectual property scholars typically present the decision on how
to protect innovation, such as a new medication or the process used to
synthesize it, as a binary choice: apply for a patent, or protect the ad-
vance as a trade secret.2 That framing is inaccurate. The correct way to
understand the decision is to contrast patenting, with its concomitant
disclosure of the advance to the public, with secrecy.3 Trade secret law is
merely one way of protecting a secret. It is normally called into action
when other methods of maintaining secrecy-non-disclosure agreements,
encryption, printing on copy-proof pages-have failed or are about to do
so.4 If the precautions to maintain secrecy that are required by the doc-
trine function as designed, then, there is no reason to call the legal sys-
tem into action. Trade secret operates in an ex post world, a last ditch
effort to prevent information from being revealed or to claw it back once
it has been disclosed.' The innovator's choice, then, is whether to try to
keep the advance secret, or to disclose it in the hope of obtaining a pa-
tent, knowing that each road brings risks and costs.
1. With apologies to Robert Frost. ROBERT FROST, The Road Not Taken, in THE ROAD NOT
TAKEN AND OTHER POEMS 1, I (Stanley Appelbaum ed., 1993).
2. See, e.g., David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some Economics
of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 62-66 (1991).
3. See Derek E. Bambauer & Simone M. Sepe, Top Secret(s) 3 (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
4. See Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret Law, 92 TEx. L. REv.
1803, 1818 (2014); Joshua Rivera, Here's the Extreme Measure Taken to Prevent the 'Star Wars:
The Force Awakens' Script from Leaking, TECH INSIDER (Aug. 12, 2015, 11:16 AM),
http://www.techinsider.io/how-star-wars-is-keeping-its-script-secret-2015-8.
5. See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures on the Internet Through Sequen-
tial Preservation, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 46-47 (2007).
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The trade-offs between patents and trade secrets are well-known.
Patents last for twenty years from the date of filing; secrets (including
trade secrets) last as long as sufficient secrecy is maintained. Patents
protect against everyone who makes, uses, sells, offers to sell, or imports
the patented invention in the United States (and some who engage in
specified extraterritorial conduct)6 ; trade secret law protects only against
those who procure the information through improper means or who are
in specified relationships with a misappropriator.7 Trade secret offers
broader subject matter coverage.8 Its protection occurs immediately,
while patent rights are enforceable, with minor exceptions, only after
examination and registration by the Patent Office.9 Patents provide great-
er notice of the boundaries of the owner's rights, as defined by the
claims, while the scope of a trade secret is determined entirely during
litigation.Io And, patents enjoy a statutory presumption of validity, such
that challengers in litigation must prove invalidity by a clear and con-
vincing standard, while trade secret owners bear the burden of establish-
ing validity during suits." Patent enforcement is entirely private, while
6. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)-(g) (2012).
7. The counterpart to the strength of these rights is the availability of defenses. Patent law
has very few defenses. The experimental use defense is effectively non-existent under the Federal
Circuit's jurisprudence. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002). There
are a few industry-specific statutory defenses, such as for doctors performing patented surgical
methods, prior business users performing patented business methods, and generic pharmaceutical
manufacturers making patented compounds as part of applying to the Food and Drug Administra-
tion. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012) (surgical methods); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (pharmaceuticals); 35
U.S.C. § 273 (2012) (business methods). By contrast, trade secret includes broader defenses, includ-
ing independent discovery, reverse-engineering, and insufficient knowledge on the part of a third-
party regarding the existence of an acquired secret. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § I (amended
1985) (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1986) (describing proper means);
id. § 1(2) (describing third-party liability); Robert G. Bone, Secondary Liability for Trade Secret
Misappropriation: A Comment, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 529, 532-33
(2006).
8. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311, 317 (2008).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(4)(A) (2012) (establishing provisional rights).
10. This point can be overstated. The meaning of claim language is determined by the court
during litigation. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-90 (1996); see also
Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REv. 101, Ill
(2005); Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, Patent Claim Construction: A
Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 717-18 (2010). Even
then, certainty is elusive, as the Federal Circuit reverses district court decisions in roughly one-
quarter to one-third of its cases. See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A
Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of the Standard of Appellate Review for Patent Claim
Construction, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (2013); see also Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of
the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001)
(noting a 44% reversal rate in an approximately two-year sample); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman
Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 239
(2005) (finding a 34.5% reversal rate after a de novo appeal). But see Ted Sichelman, Myths of
(Un)Certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1178 (2010).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012); see also Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 564 U.S. 91, 100-
02 (2011).
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trade secret misappropriation can result in both state'2 and federal1 3 crim-
inal penalties. Finally, relative costs vary widely and are indeterminate.
The cost of obtaining a patent depends upon the technology, claims, and
skill of the drafter, among other variables;14 two 2013 surveys estimate
the prosecution cost for a moderately complex patent at roughly
$10,000.' The cost of protecting a secret includes the expense of precau-
tions, such as drafting non-disclosure agreements and installing physical
safeguards, and also the expense of litigation if the precautions fail.16
Innovators facing the choice between disclosure and secrecy must
thus consider a number of factors and then balance them. In some cir-
cumstances, there may be only one plausible choice. For example, if the
inventor has been selling a product or service embodying the innovation
for more than a year, obtaining a patent is not possible, since those sales
can be cited as disqualifying prior art against an application.17 Similarly,
the invention may be too small an advance relative to the state of the art
in its field, such that an application would be rejected on obviousness
grounds.' 8 There are also considerations pressing in the other direction:
the innovation may be readily discovered on inspection of the product or
by reverse-engineering it, such that trade secret protection would be eva-
nescent.'9
Patenting may also be more valuable for business reasons. Once a
patent application has been filed, innovators can rely on it to protect their
invention (assuming that the application will be granted in time). Thus,
they can disclose details of the invention covered by the patent to poten-
tial partners, investors, potential acquirers, and the like, since there is
little risk of expropriation.20 By contrast, innovators relying on secrecy
must use devices such as contractual restrictions to ensure that limited
disclosure does not destroy the innovation's value. Patents may be easier
12. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c(b)-(c) (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266,
§ 30(4) (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 600A.035 (2015); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.05(b) (West
2015).
13. Economic Espionage Act of 1996 § 101(a), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1832 (2012).
14. See Stephen Yelderman, Improving Patent Quality with Applicant Incentives, 28 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 77, 92 n.79 (2014).
15. Brian J. Love, Do University Patents Pay Off? Evidence from a Survey of University
Inventors in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 285, 310 n.76
(2014).
16. See Friedman, Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 63.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); see also KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007).
19. See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J.
623, 639 (2013).
20. There could be exceptions. The application's disclosure may be greater than the coverage
of the claims, or the mere existence of the application could provide useful information to a competi-
tor about how to design its products. But patent is no worse than trade secret here, since an innovator
could always use similar mechanisms (such as non-disclosure agreements) to reinforce its rights.
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to value than secrets, since they are readily inspected after publication,21
and the market may treat patents as a proxy for an innovating firm's val-
ue since they act as costly screens.22 Thus, patents may be treated as hon-
est signals by investors, making innovators more likely to select disclo-
sure over secrecy.
This Article's focus is on changes that shift the equilibrium between
secrecy and disclosure. Some changes are industry-specific, such as ex-
clusions from patentable subject matter,2 3 and some sweep across all
fields, such as the falling cost of disseminating information.24 In the ag-
gregate, these changes will push innovators away from patent and away
from absolute secrecy, towards the relative secrecy of trade secret law.
B. Disclosure and Patents
The conventional wisdom for both innovators and scholars is that
patenting is preferable to secrecy. While the road to patenting is costly
and long, it rewards an inventor with strong property rights at the suc-
cessful conclusion of the journey. The shorter duration of patent protec-
tion is seen as outweighed by the strength of those rights and by the
21
greater ease of valuing the patent. Patents help innovators exclude
competitors, since neither independent discovery nor use after reverse-
engineering operate as defenses to liability for infringement. Scholars see
the disclosure from patents as driving follow-on innovation and diffusing
knowledge.26
Regardless of whether one agrees with the conventional wisdom,
innovators are likely to use trade secrets more and patents less in the
future, due in part to changes in the Patent Act and doctrine that make
obtaining a patent more difficult. First, both the text of the statute and
judicial interpretations of it have narrowed the scope of patent-eligible
subject matter relative to trade secret. The Patent Act protects only four
categories of inventions: processes, machines, manufactures, and compo-
sitions of matter.27 Furthermore, with the America Invents Act (AIA),
Congress acted to exclude one category of innovation-inventions de-
21. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609
(1962).
22. See David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV.
677, 679-82 (2012).
23. See Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted M. Sichelman & R. Polk Wagner, Life After
Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1317, 1325 (2011).
24. See Derek E. Bambauer, Middlemen, 64 FLA. L. REV. F. 64, 64 (2012).
25. See generally Schwartz, supra note 19, at 626-42.
26. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search ofJustifi-
cation, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 266 (1998) ("If an inventor chooses trade secret instead of patent,
others will be denied ready access to the information, access that would exist under patent law.").
The disclosure function is disputed, though-Mark Lemley notes that many firms do not read pa-
tents and do not perform prior art searches before developing new products. Mark A. Lemley, The
Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 333 n.89 (2008).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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signed to reduce income tax liability-from patentability, but by treating
such inventions as uniformly within the prior art rather than by deeming
28them ineligible subject matter. Some defenses, such as prior user
rights2 9 and lack of liability for physicians who practice patents covering
surgical methods,30 mean that while an innovator may formally hold a
patent, she may not be able to protect her invention effectively against all
those who make, use, or sell it. And, for inventions that may implicate
U.S. national security, government entities can prevent inventors from
obtaining patents (with the resulting disclosure of sensitive information)
via administrative orders.3 1
Courts have grafted a set of exceptions onto the text of the Patent
Act's eligible subject matter provision, and the ambit of these exceptions
has widened recently. Abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phe-
nomena cannot be patented.32 The Supreme Court has taken up each of
these exceptions recently, using its decisions to exclude more inventions
from patentability.33 For example, the Court invalidated claims in a pa-
tent held by the biotech firm, Myriad Genetics, that covered isolated
DNA codings with a specified sequence of amino acids.34 The claimed
sequences corresponded to mutations that significantly increase a wom-
an's lifetime risk of developing breast or ovarian cancers. The Court held
that the claimed sequences were ineligible because they were naturally
occurring, even though the patent claimed only the isolated sections of
the genes. Even before the case was decided, though, Myriad had
changed tactics: it built a confidential database of genetic mutations and
the maladies associated with them.35 Frustrated by patent, Myriad turned
to secrecy. Only it could offer a test detecting the risks from these muta-
tions, because only Myriad knew about them.
Second, the AIA increased the amount of prior art that can be cited
against an application during prosecution or introduced to invalidate a
patent during litigation. Under the previous version of the Patent Act,
knowledge or use of the claimed invention counted as prior art only if it
28. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 14, 125 Stat. 284, 327-28
(2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2012)) ("[Alny strategy for reducing, avoiding, or defer-
ring tax liability ... shall be deemed insufficient to differentiate a claimed invention from the prior
art.").
29. 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2012).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 122(d).
32. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
33. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs.
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609
(2010).
34. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013).
35. See Monya Baker, Policy Paper: Myriad Turns Cancer Genetic Data into Trade Secrets,
NATURE (Oct. 31, 2012, 23:14 BST), http://blogs.nature.com/news/2012/10/policy-paper-myriad-
turns-cancer-genetic-data-into-trade-secrets.htmi.
36. Id. The pattern is the same for methods of reducing tax liability: firms hold these tech-
niques or transactions as secrets. Id.
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occurred within the United States.37 The AIA removes that geographic
limitation-knowledge or use anywhere that antedates the filing of the
patent application will prevent issuance.38 The AIA also increases the
temporal scope of the prior art. Before its enactment, references such as
patent applications were available only as of their U.S. filing date or pub-
lication date, not their foreign filing date.39 The AIA alters this rule by
treating such applications as prior art based on their filing date, even if
the applications were not published or otherwise available to the public
on that date.4 This expands the storehouse of "secret" prior art that can
be used to deny or invalidate a patent. The AIA eliminates the possibility
of "swearing behind" invalidating prior art that existed under the prior
version of the Patent Act-the relevant date is when the application was
filed, not when the applicant invented the claimed advance.4 1 And, the
reform expands the ability of third parties to submit prior art during ex-
amination, increasing the likelihood that relevant references will be con-
sidered.42 Finally, the inclusion of a prior user defense under the AIA
moves the patent regime towards trade secret in that independent inven-
tion, if the defendant made commercial use of the claimed invention
more than one year prior to the relevant date of filing or public disclo-
sure, prevents liability. 43 In short, the AIA makes more references avail-
able in the prior art that can prevent a patent from issuing.
Lastly, the AIA offers new avenues for challenging an issued patent
other than litigation in federal district court. Post-grant review enables
anyone to attack the validity of a patent within a nine-month period after
issuance." The challenge can be based on any of the grounds for invali-
dating a patent during litigation, such as lack of novelty or obviousness.4 5
The party instituting post-grant review bears the burden of persuasion,
but that burden is less weighty: it is by a preponderance of the evi-
dence," rather than the clear and convincing standard that applies in liti-
gation in district court.47 Inter partes review can be invoked after the
post-grant review period expires.4 The basis for the challenge is more
limited, covering only lack of novelty or obviousness based upon prior
37. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); see Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1570
(Fed. Cir. 1997) ("If a device was 'known or used by others' in this country before the date of inven-
tion . . . it qualifies as prior art.").
38. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
39. In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859, 861 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2).
41. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (2016).
42. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. 284, 315-16 (codi-
fied at 35 U.S.C. § 122(e)).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2012); see also 35 U.S.C. § 273(b) (noting that the defendant must
establish the requisite commercial use based upon clear and convincing evidence).
44. 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012).
45. 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (referencing 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)-(b)(3) (2012)).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 326(e) (2012).
47. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
48. 35 U.S.C. § 311(c) (2012).
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art consisting of patents or printed publications.49 Here, too, the chal-
lenger bears the burden of showing unpatentability by a preponderance
of the evidence.50 Inter partes review has been surprisingly popular: as of
October 2015, challengers were filing thirty petitions per week, and the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board invalidated slightly more than half of
challenged claims.51 Thus, even a successful effort to patent an innova-
tion may be undone after the fact after the implementation of the AIA.
In short, recent changes to patent doctrine reduce the availability of
patents to innovators and may increase costs for those who do obtain
one.
C. Absolute and Relative Secrets
It is increasingly difficult to keep secrets. Sharing information is
nearly costless as Internet connectivity becomes ubiquitous, and perva-
sive indexing and capable search make it easy to discover that data.52
Some information spills inadvertently, as when a personal lubricant
company released over 250,000 customer names and addresses onto the
Internet by mistake.53 And some is forced into the open, as when attack-
ers broke into the Office of Personnel Management's database to extract
sensitive information about federal employees.54 Even governments, who
have the greatest capacity to impose secrecy, have struggled. Daniel
Ellsberg had to photocopy the Pentagon Papers slowly over time to re-
veal one government report.5 WikiLeaks, Bradley Manning,5 7 and Ed-
ward Snowden58 disclosed more information, by orders of magnitude,
with far greater speed and ease. Corporations struggle even more to
49. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).
50. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012).
51. Matt Cutler, 3 Years of IPR: A Look at the Stats, LAw360 (Oct. 9, 2015, 3:59 PM),
http://www.1aw360.com/articles/699867/3-years-of-ipr-a-look-at-the-stats; Harnessing Patent Office
Litigation, HARNESS DICKEY (2015), http://ipr-pgr.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11 /IPR-PGR-
Report-Vol.-l .pdf.
52. See Bambauer, supra note 24, at 64.
53. Ryan Singel, Security Researcher Wants Lube Maker Fined for Privacy Slip, WIRED
(July 10, 2007, 5:35 PM), http://www.wired.com/2007/07/security-resear/.
54. See Dustin Volz, More Than a Million OPM Hack Victims Still Not Notified, REUTERS
(Dec. 11, 2015, 3:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cybersecurity-opm-
idUSKBNOTU2NI20151211.
55. Michael Cooper & Sam Roberts, After 40 Years, the Complete Pentagon Papers, N.Y.
TIMES (June 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/08/us/08pentagon.html?_r-0.
56. See Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of
the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. Clv. RTS.-Civ. LIBERTIES L. REV. 311, 315-17 (2011).
57. Adam Gabbatt, "I Am Chelsea Manning, " Says Jailed Soldier Formerly Known as Brad-
ley, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2013, 12:35 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/22/bradley-manning-woman-chelsea-gender-
reassignment (stating also that Manning's first name is now Chelsea).
58. See Jason M. Breslow, How Edward Snowden Leaked "Thousands" of NSA Documents,
PBS: FRONTLINE (May 13, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-edward-snowden-
leaked-thousands-of-nsa-documents/.
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maintain control over data.59 Hackers break into a defense contractor's
computers to steal information on the Joint Strike Fighter.0 Attackers
breach corporate networks in movie studios61 and department stores62
alike. While rigorous data are difficult if not impossible to find, both the
number of breaches and their scope appears to be on the rise.6 3 Firms are
trying to hold back the tide-information technology is designed to re-
duce the costs of accessing information, not to augment them.
Secret information faces internal threats as well. Most employees
carry smartphones that feature high-resolution cameras, e-mail and file
transfer programs, and access to the corporate network.4 Firms routinely
defer to employees' choice regarding what devices to attach to corporate
networks and what, if any, security precautions to take with those devic-
es.65 Personnel with access to secrets stored in digital form can store and
share them readily, and information stored in analog form can be readily
digitized by means of a scan or photograph. Even innocent employees
can spill secrets simply by losing their device or having it compro-
mised.66 Analog information is similarly at risk, as when hospital em-
ployees leave a briefcase with information about patients with HIV on
the subway.67 Intellectual property (IP) attorneys have responded with a
59. See, e.g., Kaveh Waddell, Hospitals Aren't the Only Ones Bleeding Stolen Health Rec-
ords, ATLANTIC (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/12/hospitals-
arent-the-only-ones-bleeding-stolen-health-records/420636/.
60. See, e.g., Franz-Stefan Gady, New Snowden Documents Reveal Chinese Behind F-35
Hack, DIPLOMAT (Jan. 27, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/new-snowden-documents-reveal-
chinese-behind-f-3 5-hack/.
61. See, e.g., Mark Seal, An Exclusive Look Inside Sony's Hacking Saga, VANITY FAIR (Feb.
4, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2015/02/sony-hacking-seth-rogen-evan-
goldberg.
62. See, e.g., Michael Riley, Benjamin Elgin, Dune Lawrence & Carol Matlack, Missed
Alarms and 40 Million Stolen Credit Card Numbers: How Target Blew It, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 13,
2014, 8:31 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-03-13/target-missed-alarms-in-epic-
hack-of-credit-card-data.
63. See, e.g., Janet Brumfield, Verizon 2015 Data Breach Investigations Report, VERIZON
(Apr. 13, 2015), http://news.verizonenterprise.com/2015/04/2015-data-breach-report-info/#release;
Fahmida Y. Rashid, The Most Innovative and Damaging Hacks of 2015, INFOWORLD (Dec. 28,
2015), http://www.infoworld.com/article/3017980/security/the-most-innovative-and-damaging-
hacks-of-2015.html; 2015 Second Annual Data Breach Industry Forecast, EXPERIAN 2 (2015),
https://www.experian.com/assets/data-breach/white-papers/2015-industry-forecast-experian.pdf.
64. See Bone, supra note 26, at 274-75 n.147; Ivan. P.L. Png, Law and Innovation: Evidence
from State Trade Secrets Laws 6 (June 15, 2012), http://ssm.com/abstract-1755284 (showing that
75% of misappropriation cases involve current or former employees).
65. This phenomenon is known as "Bring Your Own Device" in the IT sector. See Dean
Evans, What Is BYOD and Why Is It Important?, TECHRADAR (Oct. 7, 2015),
http://www.techradar.com/us/news/computing/what-is-byod-and-why-is-it-important-- 1175088.
66. See, e.g., Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C & C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 1057-
58 (2d Cir. 1985).
67. Carey Goldberg, MGH Settles for $1M After HIV Patient Records Lost on Subway,
WBUR'S COMMON HEALTH REFORM & REALITY (Feb. 24, 2011),
http://commonhealth.wbur.org/2011/02/mass-general-privacy/.
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panoply of warnings and advice, but they fight a rearguard action against
technology and human error.
The plummeting costs of information have put intellectual property
regimes under significant stress. For example, copyright law operates
against an implicit assumption of costly reproduction and dissemination.
With the shift to digital media and high-speed networks, those activities
became increasingly cheap, if not effectively costless, as exemplified by
the rise of Napster and its progeny. Copyright owners turned to law as a
means of artificially driving up the cost of copying and sharing. Both
69Congress and the courts reacted by making copyright more potent.
Congress passed the No Electronic Theft Act, augmenting the penalties
for infringement and making criminal prosecution easier.70 It enacted
Title I of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, threatening liability for
users sophisticated enough to bypass technological protection measures
employed by copyright owners.7n The courts expanded vicarious and
contributory liability to hold intermediaries responsible for infringe-
ment72; when firms circumvented those schemes through clever software
design, the Supreme Court invented the new theory of inducement to
ensnare them.73 As technological changes caused information costs to
fall, copyright law responded to take up some of the slack.
Patent law faces similar pressures. The advent of low-cost, comput-
er-aided design drawings, and software to produce them, means that con-
sumers increasingly have the information necessary to duplicate patented
products, such as dentures74 and aircraft parts.75 And, the rise of relative-
ly cheap 3-D printers provides consumers with the means to use those
76
blueprints. Patent owners have responded by attempting to have the
68. See Michael H. Bunis & Anna Dray-Siegel, You Need to Work Harder to Fight Trade
Secret Theft, LAW360 (Aug. 7, 2013, 12:38 PM),
https://www.choate.com/uploads/1 78/doc/Bunis,_Dray-Siegel_-_Law360_-
YouNeedToWorkHarderToFight TradeSecretTheft.pdf; Trent Livingston, Today's
Connected Employee: A License to Steal, TRADING SECRETS (Sept. 25, 2014),
http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2014/09/articles/trade-secrets/todays-connected-employee-a-
license-to-steal/.
69. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 153-54, 160-61 (2d ed. 2006).
70. No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, § 2(b), (d), 111 Stat. 2678, 2678-79
(1997) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(A)C) (2012), and 18 U.S.C. § 2319(a)-(d) (2012), re-
spectively).
71. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103(a), 112 Stat. 2860, 2863-
65 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012)).
72. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019-24 (9th Cir. 2001).
73. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005).
74. See Susan Decker, Silicon Valley Beats Hollywood in Teeth-Straightening Case,
BLOOMBERG TECH. (Nov. 10, 2015, 8:33 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-1l-
10/align-loses-patent-appeal-over-copycat-dental-aligners.
75. See Frank Catalano, Boeing Files Patent for 3D-Printed Aircraft Parts-and Yes, It's
Already Using Them, GEEKWIRE (Mar. 6, 2015, 11:23 AM),
http://www.geekwire.com/2015/boeing-files-patent-for-3d-printing-of-aircraft-parts-and-yes-its-
already-using-them/.
76. Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the
Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1691, 1693 (2014); Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S.
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International Trade Commission and federal courts block sharing of
Computer-Aided Design (CAD) plans via the Internet.77 Similarly, the
ease of moving information technology functions outside U.S. borders
has given firms new possibilities for evading infringement liability, par-
ticularly for method patents. The response from courts has been mixed.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit adopted a flexible test for
systems claims that assesses whether the patented system has been used
in the U.S., thereby triggering infringement liability.78 The Federal Cir-
cuit's test evaluates "where control of the system is exercised and bene-
ficial use of the system obtained."79 This approach meant that the com-
pany Research In Motion (RIM), maker of the then-famous Blackberry
messaging devices, infringed patents on electronic mail systems that in-
corporated wireless components.80 Even though one part of the RIM ser-
vice was located in Canada, the Federal Circuit reasoned that control and
beneficial use were enjoyed in the U.S., where Blackberry users fanati-
cally checked their messages.8' Similarly, the Federal Circuit interpreted
liability for direct infringement of method patents to find that an Internet
company was an infringer, even though the company had arranged ac-
tivity such that its customers performed one step of the patented method
for delivering Internet content.82 A single entity must perform all of the
steps of the patented method to infringe, but the Federal Circuit broad-
ened the scope of joint patent infringement to reduce the risk of strategic
behavior, particularly in the on-line context.83
By contrast, the Supreme Court limited the extraterritorial reach of
some aspects of patent law by holding that software code installed on
computers outside U.S. borders did not count as a "component," since it
was a copy of the code residing on the PCs, rather than the original com-
pact disc itself.4 This distinction allowed Microsoft to evade liability for
infringing a patent on an apparatus for compressing and encoding
speech.8 5 Thus, while patent law has been attentive to the implications of
reduced costs for sharing (and creating) patented inventions, it has only
partially reacted to mitigate those effects.
Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D Printing, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319, 1321-
22 (2015); Sapna Kumar, Regulating Digital Trade, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1909, 1922-23 (2015).
77. ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1286-87, 1289
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (reversing International Trade Commission order that the ITC had jurisdiction to
ban "electronically imported data" under 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012)).
78. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1316-17 (Fed. Cir. 2005), abro-
gated on other grounds by Zoltek Corp. v. U.S., 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012), as recognized in
IRIS Corp. v. Japan Airlines Corp., 769 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
79. Id at 1317.
80. Id. at 1317, 1325.
81. Id. at 1317.
82. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1306, 1313, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (per curiam), rev'd Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111
(2014).
83. See id at 1317-18.
84. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 449-51, 454 (2007).
85. Id. at 458-59.
843
DENVERLAWREVIEW
Lastly, trademark law has had to respond to falling information
costs. The rise of the commercial Internet, especially the Web, led to a
wave of cybersquatting, where infringers used well-known marks in do-
main names, meta tags, e-mail messages, or page content to draw users
to their sites. Trademark holders responded with the usual array of
claims sounding in the Lanham Act or state equivalents, unfair competi-
tion, or tort. However, some behavior, such as registering but then
warehousing infringing domain names, fell outside the boundaries of
these doctrines, and some foreign defendants evaded enforcement.8
Congress responded by passing the Anticybersquatting Consumer Pro-
tection Act (ACPA), which penalized registering and trafficking in in-
fringing domain names, enabled plaintiffs to proceed in rem against do-
main names in the absence of in personam jurisdiction, and offered
heavy statutory damages to drive up the cost of infringement.89
There are at least two additional shifts on the horizon that are likely
to make it more difficult to maintain secrets. The first is technological.
The much-lauded "Internet of Things" is beginning to become reality.
The standard example is the refrigerator.90 The functionality of the fridge
is largely unchanged from the era of the icebox-multiple temperature
zones and built-in ice and water dispensers count as major feature chang-
es. But, many refrigerators have chips-CPUs-that determine when to
run the compressor, when to defrost, and other cooling-related decisions.
The humble fridge is thus catching up to other appliances, such as coffee
makers, which use chips that allow users to program automatic brewing
of coffee; washing machines, which use CPUs to determine wash cycle
time and water temperature; and heating/air conditioning units, which
employ chips to implement schedules for warming or cooling the house-
hold.91 Increasingly, however, the refrigerator-and by extension other
household appliances-will have an Internet connection as well. It will
be able to schedule maintenance, report on inventory, and display your
daily calendar by connecting to the Net. The networked refrigerator has
two important ramifications for secrecy. First, these devices will generate
new data.92 For example, a smart fridge used in a lab might generate a
86. See Nicholas Foss Barbantonis, Should Contributory Cybersquatting Be Actionable?, 17
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 79, 83, 96 (2015).
87. See, e.g., CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (S.D.
Ohio 1997).
88. See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495-96 (2d Cir. 2000).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012).
90. And that is not the most ridiculous one. See Andrew Liszewski, This Smart Rubber Duck-
ie Makes Bathtime Even More Fun (and Safer), TOYLAND (Jan. 7, 2015, 2:07 PM),
http://toyland.gizmodo.com/this-smart-rubber-duckie-makes-bathtime-lots-of-fun-an-1 678038671.
91. See Richard Baguley & Colin McDonald, Appliance Science: The Internet of Toasters
(and Other Things), CNET (Mar. 2, 2015, 11:26 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/appliance-
science-the-internet-of-toasters-and-other-things/.
92. See Klint Finley, Hacked Fridges Aren't the Internet of Things' Biggest Worry, WIRED
(Mar. 12, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/03/hacked-fridges-arent-intemet-things-
biggest-worry/.
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report notifying scientists that a particular chemical stored inside it is in
short supply. Previously, the scientists would have learned this infor-
mation via visual inspection. Now, though, the appliance itself produces
the information. Data that is more widely shared is more vulnerable to
disclosure. This brings up the second point: connecting additional devic-
es to the Internet makes them vulnerable to hacking and data breaches.93
For example, Samsung smart efrigerators implement the Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL) encryption protocol, but fail to authenticate the digital cer-
tificates used in SSL, leaving the fridges vulnerable to hackers, who suc-
cessfully impersonate the certificates via a "man-in-the-middle" attack.94
Thus, the advent of the Internet of Things means that devices generate
more data, and also increase the attack surface for hackers.95 The trend
will be similar to the introduction of the Internet-connected cell phone in
the workplace, which presented new cybersecurity challenges for firms.96
The second change is legal. Recent federal cybersecurity legislation
immunizes firms, such as Internet service providers, that share infor-
mation on IT threats with the federal government. In theory, this new
legal regime is intended to protect trade secrets (among other things) by
helping private companies and the government collaborate to prevent
hacking, intrusions, and other forms of threats. However, it also increases
risks to secrecy. As more information is monitored, shared, and stored,
some information pertinent to trade secrets will be collected and is thus
at risk of disclosure.98 The new statute imposes few requirements upon
the firms that share information and immunizes them from any legal lia-
bility for doing so." The federal cybersecurity program increases infor-
mation dissemination, in part by protecting firms from liability when
they engage in sharing. 1 As data related to trade secrets flows across the
network, some is likely to be collected, deliberately or inadvertently, and
then shared. The sharing entity has sub-optimal incentives to sort or
93. See Julie Bort, For the First Time, Hackers Have Used a Refrigerator to Attack Business-
es, Bus. INSIDER (Jan. 16, 2014, 1:36 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/hackers-use-a-
refridgerator-to-attack-businesses-2014-1.
94. John Leyden, Samsung Smart Fridge Leaves Gmail Logins Open to Attack, REGISTER
(Aug. 24, 2015, 9:03), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/08/24/smartfridgesecurityfubar/.
95. See generally Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Smart Fridge Only Capable of Displaying
Buggy Future of the Internet of Things, MOTHERBOARD (Dec. 11, 2015, 11:33 AM),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/smart-fridge-only-capable-of-displaying-buggy-future-of-the-
internet-of-things ("This is the future, where your fridge has apps, and can probably be hacked.").
96. See, e.g., Rebekah Mintzer, From Smartphones with Love: Devices Aid Corporate Espio-
nage, CORP. COUNSEL (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202652989359/From-
Smartphones-With-Love-Devices-Aid-Corporate-Espionage?slretum=20160215171934.
97. The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA), S. 754, 114th Cong., was
passed by Congress and signed into law by President Barack Obama in December 2015. Everett
Rosenfeld, The Controversial 'Surveillance' Act Obama Just Signed, CNBC (Dec. 22, 2015, 12:34
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/22/the-controversial-surveillance-act-obama-just-signed.html.
98. See Jennifer Granick, OmniCISA Pits DHS Against the FCC and FTC on User Privacy,
JUST SECURITY (Dec. 16, 2015, 6:09 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/28386/omnicisa-pits-
govemment-against-self-privacy/.




safeguard the information because it is relieved of liability when it dis-
closes it.1 oi
Technology has shifted to make it harder than ever to control who
can access and use information. Firms face low-skilled attackers, who
employ automated tools to look for vulnerabilities and misconfigura-
tions; high-skilled ones, who can write custom exploits; and insiders,
who can misuse their access to systems and information.'02 It is not pos-
sible to reverse or even meaningfully modify this change with technolo-
gy alone. Rather, innovators will have to supplement code with law, turn-
ing inevitably to trade secret as their only alternative. 103
III. IMPLICATIONS
The expanded use of trade secret that this Article predicts will cause
growing pains. Trade secret prioritizes protecting an owner's legitimate
expectations of confidentiality, to encourage innovation, to discourage
unethical behavior, or both.'1 Enforcing rights in a trade secret, howev-
er, will at times implicate, if not override, other important values. To
date, trade secret doctrine has not had to grapple much with when and
how to accommodate those countervailing values. Courts tend to invoke
the property label or condemn unfair business practices without any real
analysis-the conclusion is treated as self-supporting.o But a failure to
do so risks override, either by judicial decision or legislative fiat. Courts
and legislators will have to grapple with whether to maximize protection
for covered secrets or to accommodate countervailing interests;106 wheth-
er to prefer experimentation or uniformity;'0 7 and whether to continue the
expansion in criminal enforcement or to curtail it to mirror patent law.ios
This Part explores each of these challenges.
Perhaps the greatest risk to trade secret is when it clashes with free
speech. Unlike trademark or copyright, trade secret contains no built-in
101. Seeid
102. See Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 1011, 1016, 1022-23
(2014); see also David Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 287
(2014).
103. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 passim
(1998) (discussing how law regulates behavior both directly and indirectly).
104. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-82 (1974).
105. The cases often remind one of a line from Ring Lardner's novel The Young Immigrunts:
"Shut up he explained." RING W. LARDNER, JR., THE YOUNG IMMIGRUNTS 778 (1920). Thanks to
Toni Massaro for this reference.
106. See David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infra-
structure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135 passim (2007).
107. See Michael Risch, An Empirical Look at Trade Secret Law's Shif from Common to
Statutory Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 151, 156 (Shyamkrishna
Balganesh ed., 2013).
108. See Robert M. Isackson & Sonia Valdez, New Year, New Progress. The Defend Trade
Secrets Act Reports Out from the Senate Judiciary Committee, ORRICK: TRADE SECRETS WATCH
(Jan. 29, 2016), http://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-watch/2016/01/29/new-year-new-progress-the-
defend-trade-secrets-act-reports-out-from-the-senate-judiciary-committee/#more- 1749.
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accommodation for First Amendment interests.109 Scholars have criti-
cized this myopia, but courts have rarely faced cases that present signifi-
cant free speech issues.o10 An increase in trade secret protection, and
hence litigation, makes such a clash inevitable, though. For example,
energy companies have begun to extract natural gas through a process
known as fracking.i" Fracking requires injection of chemicals into the
ground to enable withdrawal of the gas; the firms treat the components
and make-up of the inoculants as trade secrets.'12 Critics have charged
that the chemicals pose significant health risks. Energy companies have
refused to divulge their formulas, even to legislators, by citing trade se-
crecy. A whistleblower, who made the formula public-or a newspa-
per that published it-might be held liable for misappropriation, perhaps
even facing an injunction against further distribution."14 Such a remedy
would immediately implicate the First Amendment, especially if the
health risks proved to be real. 5 Courts have refused to block dissemina-
tion of other content obtained in violation of various laws, and it is likely
that free speech interests would eventually trump here, too." 6
The second tension is with federalism. Trade secret is a creature of
state law, developing initially as a tort that policed unfair business prac-
tices."7 The advent of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) in 1979
was an important shift towards greater uniformity among the states, near-
ly all of which have adopted it."'8 However, three states (New York,
Massachusetts, and Texas) with important innovation sectors do not use
the UTSA." 9 States differ from one another on which UTSA provisions
they have adopted and the statutory language used to implement them.20
109. See Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1401, 1404-06,
1412 (2014).
110. See Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the
First Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J, 777, 777-78 (2007).
111. John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The Fracking Revolution: Shale Gas as a Case
Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L.J. 955, 955, 962 (2015).
112. Mary Winter, Drilling Down on Shale Gas, ST. LEGISLATURES, July-Aug. 2013, at 8,
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/l/Documents/magazine/articles/2013/SL_0713-Trends.pdf.
113. Hannah Wiseman, Trade Secrets, Disclosure, and Dissent in a Fracturing Energy Revolu-
tion, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 1-2 (2010).
114. Cf Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, 105
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 16-17) (Univ. Cal. Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper
No. 2686565, Nov. 2015), http://ssm.com/abstract-2686565 (discussing that injunctions are routine-
ly used to suppress the disclosure of trade secrets).
115. See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectu-
al Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 229-32 (1998).
116. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (per curiam) (explaining that a prior restraint suppressing the distribution of a classified study
violates the First Amendment); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (holding that
disclosure of an illegally recorded conversation was protected by the First Amendment because it
was about a matter of public concern).
117. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478-93 (1974) (discussing the evolu-
tion and policy of trade secret law).
118. See generally Risch, supra note 107.
119. Png, supra note 64, at 2.
120. See generally Risch, supra note 107.
847
DENVER LAW RE VIEW
Common law precedent continues to play a role in cases brought under
UTSA-based statutes, and some states, such as California, have not en-
tirely pre-empted common law trade secret.121 All of these features gen-
erate variation among state trade secret regimes. This accords well with
the concept of state regimes as useful policy experiments.12 2 The federal
role in trade secret law is currently limited to enforcement via criminal
prosecution under certain circumstances, such as where misappropriation
benefits a foreign power.123
That is likely to change as trade secret usage expands. The past sev-
eral congressional sessions have seen the introduction of legislation to
federalize trade secret.1 24 Supporters tout he benefits of uniformity and
predictability, particularly for firms that operate in multiple states.125 A
federal trade secret system would have drawbacks, however.126 It would
sacrifice the distributed development and evolution of doctrine that state
variation produces.127 It would increase the workload of the federal court
system, particularly if jurisdiction were to be exclusively federal.12 8 And,
a federal statute would need to decide between pre-empting similar state
claims, as with patent and copyright, or whether to operate in parallel, as
with trademark.
Shifting to a federal trade secret system also heightens the clash
with other legal regimes. California, for example, denies enforcement to
any contractual term that limits labor mobility.1 29 While it may be nomi-
nally possible to craft an agreement that protects a firm's trade secrets
after an employee leaves the company, success at that task has been
scarce to date.'30 A federal trade secret regime would thus have spillover
effects into other areas of state-based regulation.
121. Id
122. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("[A] single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
123. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (2012).
124. See, e.g., Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015, H.R. 3326, 114th Cong.,
https://www.congress.gov/l 14/bills/hr3326/BILLS-ll 4hr3326ih.pdf.
125. See, e.g., Orrin Hatch & Chris Coons, Pass the Defend Trade Secrets Act, HILL (Jan. 27,
2016, 7:00 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/267205-pass-the-defend-trade-secrets-act.
126. See Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L.
REV. 317, 321-22 (2015).
127. See Letter from Eric Goldman, Professor of Law, Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law et al. to




128. Id. at 1, 5-6.
129. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2016) ("[E]very contract by which anyone is
restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent
void.").
130. See Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 292 (Cal. 2008) (holding that an
employee's non-competition and non-solicitation agreement was invalid because it restricted the
employee from practicing his profession). But see Richmond Techs., Inc. v. Aumtech Bus. Sols., No.
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The third tension relates to enforcement. While patent law provides
stronger property-like rights over an invention, trade secret's enforce-
ment regime does have one significant advantage: criminal penalties at
both the state131 and federall32 level. Patent law is unusual in this regard:
the federal Copyright Actl33 and Lanham Actl34 (trademark) both create
criminal liability in some circumstances, and some neighboring rights,
such as the federal anti-bootlegging statute,13 5 also impose criminal pen-
alties. Scholars largely conclude that the lack of criminal penalties for
patent infringement is not a deliberate policy decision, but rather derives
from public choice issues.136 Criminal enforcement of IP rights is attrac-
tive to at least some innovators, since it can augment deterrence through
greater sanctions, and because it transfers some of the cost of vindicating
intellectual property rights from the owner to the public fisc. If innova-
tors shift to relying more on trade secret, they are likely to push prosecu-
tors to pursue charges against infringers. And while the number of feder-
al criminal cases involving intellectual property is quite small, state pros-
ecutors may be more amenable to such pressures, especially where the
rightsholder is a state resident and the alleged infringer is not.137
To date, trade secret doctrine has largely evaded clashes with other
legal regimes. The increasing use of legal protections for confidential
information will mean that legislators and courts must confront and re-
solve clashes with free speech protections, federalism concerns, and
choice of enforcement models.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to prophesy, especially about the future.138
1-CV-02460-LHK, 2011 WL 2607158, at *15-21 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011) (holding (in a trial for a
preliminary injunction) that a non-compete clause may be enforceable and employees may have
engaged in unfair competition and breached a non-disclosure agreement).
131. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c (West 2016); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(4)
(2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 600A.035 (2015); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.05 (West 2015).
132. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1832 (2012).
133. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012).
134. 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2012).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a)(3) (2012).
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U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRO IP ACT ANN. REP. FY2012, at 31 (2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/201 3/01/29/doj-pro-ip-rpt2O12.pdf; and then
citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. JUST. STAT., 2009, at 13 (2011),
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf).
138. This quote has been variously attributed, most prominently to Niels Bohr and Yogi Berra
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To summarize, I argue that innovators must inevitably turn to trade
secret, as patents are increasingly costly or unavailable, and other
measures of maintaining more absolute secrecy are less reliable. This
framework usefully generates some predictions that can be tested empiri-
cally. First, it suggests that trade secret litigation should not only in-
crease, but that the rate of increase should go up over time.1 39 Second, the
ratio of trade secret suits to patent suits should increase as well, if inno-
vators are shifting from the latter to the former as their preferred method
of protection. Third, criminal prosecution of trade secret cases hould
increase at both the state and federal levels, both in absolute terms and
relative to IP cases as a whole.1"4 Fourth, firms are likely to attempt to
develop new ways of measuring the value of trade secrets to address the
valuation problem.141 Finally-and perhaps most difficult to quantify-
the frequency with which defendants interpose defenses unrelated to
trade secret will increase. California may be an especially useful testing
ground for this prediction since the state has several other legal regimes
that can conflict with trade secret protection.
One challenge to evaluating claims empirically is that trade secrets
are hard to detect. There is no registration process for a trade secret; it is
defined only retrospectively in litigation to determine whether misappro-
priation has occurred.142 Secrets are hard to value on a firm's books and
difficult to measure in quantity or quality.143 An increase in utilization of
trade secrets might be detected by proxy, such as the volume of litiga-
tion, perhaps after a lag time. But, by definition, these advances are se-
crets and not amenable to measurement. The existence and scale of any
shift will be challenging to determine, and will likely need to use sec-
ondary or partial measures, such as proxies or surveys, rather than direct
observation.
Litigation is one such secondary measure, and this Article predicts
that trade secret litigation will increase; that the rate of increase will also
go up; and that it will increase relative to patent litigation.' An increase
in litigation assumes that actual or threatened misappropriation is either
independent of the volume of trade secrets or varies directly with it.
Thus, more trade secrets generates more misappropriation, particularly
given that self-help becomes less effective with technological shifts that
139. See David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal
Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 301 (2010); see also David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis
of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 61 (2011); Png, supra note 64, at 3.
140. This is concededly difficult to measure. See Josh Lerner, Using Litigation to Understand
Trade Secrets: A Preliminary Exploration 8 (Aug. 2006),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=922520.
141. See Bambauer & Sepe, supra note 3, at 29-30.
142. See Chagai Vinizky, Trade Secrets Registry, 35 PACE L. REV. 455, 457 (2014) (proposing
registration for trade secrets).
143. See Bambauer & Sepe, supra note 3, at 5.
144. See Lerner, supra note 140, at 11-12.
850 [Vol. 93:4
2016] SECRECY IS DEAD -LONG LIVE TRADE SECRETS
drive the cost of distributing information down. Those shifts also explain
the change in the rate of increase-firms will need to employ litigation to
protect secrets more often than in the past because their own precautions
become less effective.
Lawsuits are not always successful even when claims are meritori-
ous, leading to suboptimal deterrence. Misappropriators know there is at
least some chance that they will escape detection or, if caught, will avoid
liability. 145 Trade secret owners are thus likely to lobby both for criminal
penalties for misappropriation and for prosecutors to bring charges
against alleged infringers. Law enforcement resources are relatively stat-
ic. If reliance on trade secrecy does increase, prosecutions will likely
remain mostly constant in the short run, which means that criminal en-
forcement would decrease relative to the level of misappropriation. Trade
secret owners will respond by pressing for more resources to be devoted
to the problem, in an absolute sense and as a share of a prosecutor's time
and budget. This prediction mirrors what has happened in other areas of
IP, where rightsholders have pressed successfully for more resources to
battle infringement. For example, the PRO IP Act of 2008 created dedi-
cated federal positions in the executive branch and in embassies to com-
bat violations of IP rights.'4 Politically, it is likely palatable to go after
misappropriation, given the roots of trade secrecy in policing unethical
commercial behavior. 147 Prosecutions for trade secrets offenses are likely
to rise over time.
As innovators shift to trade secret, they face the risk that outsiders,
such as shareholders, will be unable to value correctly their advances.148
Indeed, underpricing is likely to occur. Because claims of having a secret
invention are cheap talk, markets will rationally discount those claims,
and innovators will be unable to realize fully the value of their secret
advances. Firms are likely to try to overcome Arrow's paradox to realize
the full value of their innovation. 149 There are a number of standard valu-
ation models, but all rely on access to information-precisely the prob-
lem with a secret.50 The most likely answer is to use a third-party certifi-
145. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages. An Economic Analysis,
111 HARV. L. REv. 869, 887-95 (1998).
146. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-403, § 301, 122 Stat. 4256, 4264-66 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8111 (2012)).
147. Changes to patent enforcement are somewhat cabined politically because firms can rea-
sonably predict that they may be an infringer as well as a rightsholder, particularly given the uncer-
tain definition of a patent's claims or boundaries before trial. By contrast, firms are likely to believe
(even if inaccurately) that hey will not engage in unethical behavior such as espionage or inducing
employees to breach agreements. See generally Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
485-87 (1974) (discussing the steps companies and individuals will take to protect against breaches
of confidence and "industrial espionage").
148. Bambauer & Sepe, supra note 3, at 29-32.
149. Arrow, supra note 21, at 623-25.
150. See, e.g., Gavin C. Reid, Nicola Searle & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, What's It Worth to Keep
a Secret?, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 116, 137-40 (2015); Robert P. Schweihs, The Value ofa Trade
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er, where the certifier is under a duty of confidentiality to the trade secret
owner, but is sufficiently trustworthy that its estimate of the secret's val-
ue will be credible.15 1
Unfortunately, the history of third-party certifiers is mixed at best.
Certifiers must constantly balance credibility, which protects their repu-
tation and makes their signals valuable, against appealing to clients, who
want the highest possible rating for their secrets. There can be adverse
selection, as with services that rate the privacy protections provided by
Web sites.15 2 Firms can set up their own certifiers, a practice known in-
formally as "greenwashing."i5 3 Companies may be selective about the
information they disclose to certifiers. And, the time lag between the
certifier's estimate and the eventual revelation of the secret's value (as
embodied in products and services) may make it hard to gauge how accu-
rate those calculations were. One can expect firms to try to gain credit in
the marketplace for their secret innovations, but it will be challenging to
do so.
This Article's claim about the coming rise of trade secrecy is a de-
scriptive one, not a normative one. Trade secret is generally viewed with
skepticism by legal scholars, who tend to prefer the disclosure-based
regime of patents.154 Ultimately, whether the shift towards trade secret is
desirable depends upon a complex and likely unknowable empirical cal-
culus. If trade secrecy enables innovators to capture more of the returns
from inventions, since secrets can have indefinite duration, the change is
likely to increase incentives to engage in this type of research and devel-
opment. And, depending upon whether one prefers coordinated versus
distributed investigation of an advance's prospects, trade secret could
increase or decrease development of an invention.156 Finally, secrecy
prevents others in the field from learning about innovation, which may
Secret, INSIGHTS, Autumn 2009, at 48, 51-53,
http://www.willamette.com/insightsjournal/09/autumn_2009_5.pdf.
151. The use of trusted third parties to overcome information asymmetry problems, and specif-
ically Arrow's paradox, has occurred in a number of situations, including when motion picture and
television producers receive unsolicited scripts. See Catherine L. Fisk, The Role ofPrivate Intellec-
tual Property Rights in Markets for Labor and Ideas: Screen Credit and the Writers Guild ofAmeri-
ca, 1938-2000, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 215, 249-50, 261-664 (2011). I have proposed such
a method for managing markets for software vulnerability disclosures. See Derek E. Bambauer &
Oliver Day, The Hacker s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1100-03 (2011).
152. See Benjamin Edelman, Adverse Selection in Online "Trust" Certifications and Search
Results, ELECTRONIC COM. RES. & APPLICATIONS passim (2010),
http://www.benedelman.org/publications/advsel-trust-se.pdf.
153. See Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377, 440-41 (2009).
154. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 26, at 282-84, 292-93.
155. See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J.
623, 637-38 (2013); see also Png, supra note 64, at 1.
156. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 288 (1977).
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decrease research and development by others.'57 The net effect on inno-
vation is unclear, but the coming rise of trade secrets could provide a
valuable, quasi-natural experiment to evaluate the merits of secrecy ver-
sus disclosure.
157. This assumes that patents function to disseminate information, an assumption challenged
by Mark Lemley and other scholars. Some firms instruct researchers not to read patents, for fear of
increased damages if the companies are later found to infringe those patents. Mark A. Lemley, The
Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 333 n.89 (2008).
Moreover, patents often do not reveal key information related to commercializing an invention, as
opposed to simply practicing it. See also Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without
Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REv. 227, 247-54 (2012).
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